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CHAPTER 3 
A NEW INDEX OF FISCAL DECENTRALISATION 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
A nation state is traditionally classified as federal or unitary political systems, 
depending on whether or not its written (or unwritten) constitution legally provides for 
multiple tiers of “sovereign” governments with jurisdictions that feature over overlapping 
geographically defined areas of the nation. Within unitary countries, political and fiscal 
authority is generally centralised in the hands of the national government, whilst the 
powers and responsibilities of subnational governments (“SNGs”) are usually limited and 
ad hoc. In contrast, the general powers and responsibilities of various levels of 
government in federal countries are usually constitutionally protected and clearly 
allocated to different tiers of government. As such, SNGs in federal countries are 
generally expected to exert more autonomy when making policy decisions in their 
respective jurisdictions than is the case for unitary countries. However, the extent to 
which fiscal responsibilities are allocated across various levels of government or even 
shared among them varies from federation to federation. 
 
A typical federal framework provides some legal authority for the assignment of 
responsibilities for service provision across all tiers of government, with SNGs having 
some degree of autonomy over their own spending programs. Similarly, there is an 
assignment of taxing powers with SNGs having some degree of autonomy over their tax 
rates and bases. The assignments of service provision responsibilities and tax powers are 
fundamental to fiscal federalism. Additionally, there are two other significant issues in 
fiscal federalism. The first issue is intergovernmental fiscal transfers, which usually take 
place from the national or higher levels of government to the lower levels of government. 
The second issue is borrowings by SNGs. These last two issues are particularly important 
when there is a mismatch between service provision responsibilities and revenue 
assignment between national and subnational levels of government. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the assignment of responsibility for the provision of public services, the   54
assignment of revenue-raising powers, fiscal transfer, and subnational borrowing, 
represent the four pillars of fiscal federalism.  
 
The early first generation literature on fiscal federalism tended to emphasise the 
analytics of intergovernmental transfers. The more recent literature has focused on the 
policy relevance of changing the fiscal constitution by varying the degree of fiscal 
authority assigned to SNGs – especially in developing nations. In a long term, when the 
relationship between the assignments of responsibility for spending and revenue-raising 
powers changes, there must be a corresponding change in the “degree” of fiscal 
autonomy among different tiers of government. In practice, federal nations tend to be 
more fiscally decentralised than unitary countries. This can be partly explained by the 
fact that federal countries have a tendency to assign greater powers and responsibilities to 
lower levels of government. However, this does not guarantee that federalism is a 
necessary condition for decentralisation. 
  
  The contribution of this chapter is the development of a fundamental fiscal 
decentralisation index (“FDI”) which takes two main attributes of fiscal activities of 
SNGs – fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance – into consideration. The theoretical basis 
for constructing this index is grounded in the theory of fiscal decentralisation, which, as 
mentioned in Chapter 2, is generally not the case for existing measures of fiscal 
decentralisation. The degree of fiscal decentralisation across countries can be compared 
using this FDI. Following this introduction, Section 3.2 outlines the theoretical grounding 
for the development of the FDI and examines the distinct notions of fiscal autonomy and 
fiscal importance of SNGs. Development of the fundamental index of fiscal 
decentralisation is outlined in Section 3.3, followed by the extensive discussion on the 
example of the index. The application of the index to a wide range of countries from the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) is analysed in Section 3.4. Main conclusions 
are included in Section 3.5.  
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3.2  Fiscal decentralisation: fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance 
 
The fiscal autonomy of SNGs primarily deals with the assignment of taxing 
powers and the assignment of responsibility for public provision of specific goods and 
services, although, it may also be influenced by arrangements pertaining to 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers and external limitations applying to the borrowing of 
SNGs. The fiscal importance of SNGs, however, is directly connected with the level of 
fiscal activities of SNGs relative to that of the fiscal activities of all levels of government. 
 
3.2.1  Fiscal autonomy of subnational governments 
 
In practice, agreement on the distribution of taxing powers is difficult since the 
institutional actors (national government and SNGs) approach their respective powers 
from two different perspectives. Under the core first generation theory of fiscal 
decentralisation, the national government needs to be responsible for a range of volatile, 
but high-yield tax bases to achieve economic stabilisation and realise income 
redistribution goals. SNGs focus on controlling immobile and stable tax bases that have 
stable revenue flows to implement their duties in the provision of public goods and 
services which are fundamental to community welfare. Examples include studies from 
Bird (2000, 1999); McLure (1998); and Musgrave (1983). Taxing at the national level 
provides a foundation to avoid distortionary competition among states in the country and 
to reduce compliance costs. When the gap between spending responsibility and the taxing 
power of SNGs is to be minimised, or even eliminated, the fiscal autonomy of SNGs 
increases. 
 
Fiscal autonomy of SNGs implies that, to some extent, SNGs can arrange their 
revenue by exercising control over their own taxing bases to cover costs occurring in the 
provision of public goods and services
2. As a result, when SNGs’ fiscal autonomy is 
high, intergovernmental fiscal transfers will no longer be a significant source of revenue 
                                                 
2 When debts of SNGs are set aside, fiscal autonomy of SNGs is revealed when SNG expenditures are fully 
funded from SNG own-sourced revenues.   56
for SNGs. However, as McLure (1998) has perceptively noted, even in the absence of 
fiscal transfers (“grants”), SNGs will not enjoy full fiscal autonomy if they rely on 
revenues from taxes that are shared directly with the national government, especially 
when these tax bases and rates are centrally determined. The political corollary of this 
being that SNGs with responsibility for funding services are accountable through the 
election processes. When responsibility for tax bases, tax rates and the share from tax 
received from these bases among two or more governments is confined just to the higher 
level of government, the political accountability of SNGs and the fiscal autonomy of 
SNGs become compromised. The necessary condition for a high degree of fiscal 
autonomy is that SNGs themselves have the discretion to set tax rates and bases (so that 
they can adjust their revenue by varying the rates and/or bases) in response to fiscal 
demand for publicly provided goods and services. If this is not the case, flexibility and 
the potential for creativity by SNGs for the efficient provision of public goods and 
services are limited.  
 
Autonomy of SNGs is a frequent theme in the literature on the theory of fiscal 
decentralisation within the first generation theory. The theme is evident in the core 
Musgrave – Oates approach (Musgrave, 1983 and Oates, 1972) and in the public choice 
approach (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980). 
 
In the event of a long-period mismatch between SNGs’ spending responsibility 
and revenue capacity, vertical fiscal imbalance will inevitably emerge and must be 
managed by the national government through intergovernmental fiscal grants and 
advances. Vertical fiscal imbalance implies a mismatch between own-sourced revenue 
(total revenue less: (i) grants from other levels of government and (ii) revenue from 
shared taxes when one level of government controls the base, rate and revenue shared) 
and own purpose spending (expenditure less grants to other levels of government) for a 
particular level of government (Collins, 2001). When SNGs have adequate fiscal 
autonomy, ex-post vertical fiscal imbalance is expected to be minimised before any fiscal   57
transfer takes place
3. However, it is also suggested that if the national government has 
sole responsibility for determining the nation’s tax bases, and then filling the gap of 
vertical fiscal imbalance, this decision may reduce the incentive for the SNGs to increase 
their respective taxing powers and to manage public spending efficiently (Ahmad and 
Craig, 1997). History suggests that the mismatch between spending and taxing endures, 
leaving at least some balancing role for the national government in fiscal transfers (Bird 
and Smart, 2002). For example, small to moderate fiscal transfers may be seen as a 
largely unavoidable tendency in both federal and unitary countries because SNGs are not 
homogenous entities – some have relatively high revenue-raising capacity while others 
have relatively low revenue-raising power. In practice, though, the extent of fiscal 
transfers extends well beyond that required to equalise fiscal capacities. 
 
Therefore, it is clear that fiscal autonomy of SNGs should be a very important 
element of any measure of fiscal decentralisation. Discussion of the degree of fiscal 
decentralisation of a particular country without dealing directly with the fiscal autonomy 
of SNGs is, as a consequence, only partial. Nevertheless, fiscal autonomy is still only 
one, albeit important, element in the theory of fiscal decentralisation. The degree of fiscal 
decentralisation also depends on the proportion of total public sector fiscal activities 
undertaken by SNGs. That is, “fiscal importance” is the other main “element” of fiscal 
decentralisation in the theory of fiscal decentralisation. 
 
3.2.2  Fiscal importance of subnational governments and the “principle of subsidiarity” 
 
In core first generation fiscal theory, economic performances of the government 
should become more productive, efficient and effective if services are provided by the 
lowest level of government. This was known in Europe when the Maastricht Treaty was 
being drafted, and is now referred to across the world as the “principle of subsidiarity” 
(Martinez-Vazquez, 2001, p.12). Services such as foreign affairs, defence, immigration, 
and the regulation (or deregulation) of international trade can be best implemented by the 
                                                 
3 This happens at least for the aggregate of SNGs. It is still possible, of course, for individual SNGs to run 
deficits or surpluses, even when the vertical fiscal imbalance is to be eliminated between the national 
government and the aggregate of the SNGs.     58
national governments because they influence everyone in the nation in a broadly similar 
way. SNGs, however, are able to provide many important, but “impure” from a public 
finance theory perspective, public services for provincial communities such as law, 
education, health policy, as well as very local issues such as the street lighting system, 
garbage collection, and local paper deliveries. Services provided by the national 
government conform to the principle of subsidiarity when demand is at a broadly 
constant level across various subnational localities to efficiently supply national public 
goods to take advantage of economies of scale – an increase in production efficiency as 
the quantity of public goods and services being produced and provided rises; and 
economies of scope – potential cost savings from joint production even if services 
provided are not directly related to each other. However, when demand varies from 
location to location, national provision to a common standard leads to inefficient 
underprovision, in some areas, and inefficient overprovision, in other areas. In short, 
services provided by the national government assume tastes and preferences to be 
homogeneous across locations and for citizens within locations.  
 
SNGs can provide goods and services based on the size of jurisdiction, and in 
accordance with local tastes and preferences (Shah, 2004). If the size of jurisdiction is 
considered, the principle of benefit matching will be achieved because local citizens who 
receive benefits also bear costs. Also, the cost for publicly provided goods and services 
can be recovered, at least at the margin by a system of fees and user charges, so that the 
pressures from the lack of financial resources for SNGs decrease. As a consequence, 
services are provided more efficiently. Levels of goods and services provided should be 
equal to the amount demanded by the community to avoid both under- or overprovision 
of public goods and services.  
 
It should be noted that, to the extent that state (or local) owned enterprises are 
funded by state (or local) government expenditures through the purchase of goods and 
services for the community, these expenditures are reflected in the fiscal decentralisation 
index via the component of “fiscal importance of SNGs”. However, finances of a public   59
enterprise itself are not considered SNGs’ finances. Similarly, when a private enterprise 
sells services to state or local governments, these values are also included in the index. 
 
On the basis of the principle of subsidiarity, one would expect that it is efficient 
for SNGs to account for a significant proportion of fiscal activity across the nation. The 
larger the portion of public sector spending undertaken by SNGs, the greater the degree 
of their fiscal importance. This issue of SNGs’ fiscal importance and the degree of fiscal 
autonomy that the SNGs have over their revenue-raising decisions need to be recognised 
in any index of fiscal decentralisation.  
 
3.3  The development of a fundamental index of fiscal decentralisation 
 
3.3.1  Background 
 
To date, measurement of fiscal decentralisation in studies of public finances has 
been very crude. Typically, either revenue or expenditure from SNGs has been used 
without taking into account the level of fiscal autonomy of lower level governments. For 
example, in his pioneering study, Oates (1972) uses the national government share in 
total public revenue as the degree of fiscal centralisation. More recently, Woller and 
Phillips (1998) measure fiscal decentralisation in one of four ways: (i) the ratio of local 
government revenues to total government revenues; (ii) the ratio of local government 
revenues less grants-in-aid to total government revenues; (iii) the ratio of local 
government expenditures to total government expenditures and (iv) the ratio of local 
government expenditures to total government expenditures less defence and social 
security expenditures. Similarly, Davoodi and Zou (1998) measure the level of fiscal 
decentralisation as the spending by SNGs as a fraction of total government spending. It is 
widely-accepted that the measurement of fiscal decentralisation in previous works has 
been undertaken on a superficial basis. There has, for example, been almost no 
recognition of the important distinction between subnational “revenue” and own-sourced 
revenue over which subnational jurisdiction has policy autonomy. The one exception to 
this is the study, by Victoria Curzon Price and Jacques Garello (2003), of European   60
countries, but this study relies heavily on the subjective assessments of fiscal scholars 
with expertise in the state of affairs in particular European countries. As such, the index 
developed from their study is not readily applied to other countries for accurate 
international comparisons. 
 
Problems with current indices are now recognised, as suffering “from lack of 
details on expenditure autonomy and own-sourced revenue to deficiencies regarding 
reported data for the subnational levels and information scarcity for analysing dispersion 
among subnational regions” (Breuss and Eller, 2004, p.12). In short, the above-mentioned 
measures are inadequate because fiscal autonomy of SNGs has not been properly taken 
into consideration. As a result, the theoretical literature is extended in this chapter 
through the development and application of a fundamental fiscal decentralisation index 
(“FDI”) that allows an international comparison of various nations’ degree of fiscal 
decentralisation. 
 
3.3.2  Establishment of a fundamental fiscal decentralisation index 
 
Consistent with the conceptual discussions in Section 3.2, two main components 
have been included in the FDI in this chapter – a component for fiscal autonomy and a 
component for the fiscal importance of SNGs. 
 
Component 1: Fiscal autonomy of subnational governments 
The core issue in fiscal autonomy centres on the relationship between SNGs’ 
own-sourced revenues and expenditures. In view of this, SNGs’ fiscal autonomy is, in the 
first instance, represented by the ratio of SNGs’ own-sourced revenue (OSR)
4 to SNGs’ 
expenditure (E). The ratio provides an indication of vertical fiscal imbalance between the 
national government and SNGs – the lower the ratio, the greater the degree of vertical 
fiscal imbalance with the difference between own-sourced revenue and expenditure being 
largely funded by fiscal transfers from the national government. More formally, the 
                                                 
4  As defined in Section 3.2.1   61
relative level of autonomy of SNGs, which is termed “fiscal autonomy” (FA) in this 
study, may be defined and measured as: 

















,                  0 ≤ FA ≤ 1
5  
where  i OSR  and  i E  represent the own-sourced revenue and expenditure for subnational 
region i (the highest level of SNGs, usually states of federal countries or provinces of 
unitary nations). Fiscal autonomy of SNGs will be treated in a more comprehensive 
fashion in Chapter 4, with equation (3.1) extended to account for the impact on autonomy 
of fiscal transfers between governments, and restrictions on the borrowing authority of 
SNGs. For the remainder of this chapter, however, fiscal autonomy of SNGs is defined 
by equation (3.1). 
 
Component 2: Fiscal importance of subnational governments 
The relative importance of fiscal activities undertaken by SNGs depends on the 
fiscal activities of SNGs as well as the fiscal activities of all public bodies across the 
nation. For this study, public expenditure is taken as the “indicator” of fiscal activity, 
mainly because the law of subsidiarity is expressed in relation to expenditure. On this 
basis, the relative importance of SNGs or what we call “fiscal importance” may be 
defined and measured as: 










 ,     0 ≤ FI ≤ 1   
where TE represents total public sector expenditures by all levels of government within 
the nation. This includes expenditures from the national government and from all SNGs, 
excluding fiscal transfers from one government to another (such as the national 
government fiscal transfers to SNGs). 
                                                 
5 Equation 3.1 could give a value of fiscal autonomy that is greater than 1 when SNGs’ budget surplus 
exceeds transfers received from the national government. However, in such an (unlikely) case, the 
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In this study, fiscal importance is defined with reference to fiscal aggregates and 
without reference to the composition of expenditure across levels of governments. In 
practice, however, a dollar spent on health or education by a state government may have 
different welfare consequences, compared to a dollar spent on defence by the national 
government. As a result, the measure of the fiscal importance of SNGs developing in this 
study does not provide any direct linear correlation with economic welfare in general or 
any indication of welfare outcomes related to the provision of specific public services 
(see Section 3.3.4). 
 
In both equations (3.1) and (3.2), the denominator is based on public expenditure 
– SNGs’ public expenditure in the case of equation (3.1) and total public expenditure in 
equation (3.2). As such, public expenditure may be viewed as the reference point against 
which both “fiscal autonomy” and “fiscal importance” are assessed. Fiscal autonomy is 
represented by SNGs’ own-sourced revenue to SNGs’ expenditures, and fiscal 
importance is SNGs’ expenditure to total public expenditure. 
 
A fundamental index of fiscal decentralisation based on the “fiscal autonomy and fiscal 
importance” approach 
Equations (3.1) and (3.2) provide measures of two important but distinct elements 
of fiscal decentralisation. The fundamental index of fiscal decentralisation (FDI) 
proposed in this study is the geometric mean of the measures of the two elements: 
























     
In principle, this index would be greater than one when, and only when, there is a 
negative total expenditure from the national government, a completely implausible 
situation. In the unlikely event that it occurs, the measure of fiscal importance of SNGs is 
capped at unity (1.0). To illustrate how equation (3.3) represents a degree of fiscal 
decentralisation, four different hypothetical cases are considered in Table 3.1.    63
 
TABLE 3.1 
ILLUSTRATIVE NUMERICAL EXAMPLES 
























= ∑   TE FA  FI FDI 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  A. Perfect decentralisation 
1 10  10  10  1  1  1 
  B. Relative fiscal decentralisation 
2 40  100  100  0.4  1 0.63 
3 40  40  100 1  0.4  0.63 
  C. Relative fiscal centralisation 
4 60  100  500  0.6  0.2  0.35 
5 20  100  167  0.2  0.6  0.35 
  D. Perfect fiscal centralisation 
6 0  10  100  0  0.1 0 
 
As shown in panel A, the first case is when the country has achieved a condition 
of a perfect decentralisation, indicated by FDI = 1 in column 6. This represents the 
unlikely case when all public sector fiscal activity is undertaken by SNGs. The second 
case is where the value of FDI lies between the two extremes of 1 and 0, as shown in 
panels B and C. Here, the country has some degree of fiscal decentralisation, a situation 
which can be described as “relative fiscal decentralisation”, where 0.5 1, FDI < <  as in 
the case of panel B, or “relative fiscal centralisation”, where 00 . 5 , FDI < <  as in the case 
of panel C. Perfect fiscal centralisation, in which subnational expenditure is fully funded 
by fiscal transfers from the national government (i.e. SNGs’ own-sourced revenue is 
zero), is the last extreme case () 0 FDI =  which is considered in panel D. 
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For the first case (panel A), total own-sourced revenue and expenditure from 
SNGs are both 10 units. It is also assumed that total public sector expenditure is 10 units. 
This assumption implies that there is no expenditure from the national government 
because total public sector expenditure is equal to total subnational expenditure from 
subnational regions. In this case, the values of both fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance 
as represented by equations (3.1) and (3.2) are unity. As a result, the country has 
achieved a perfect fiscal decentralisation as  1. FDI =  Perfect centralisation pertains in the 
example in row 6. This is the case when SNGs have no own-sourced revenue (column 1) 
and incur the expenditure of 10 units (column 2). As a consequence, the value of fiscal 
autonomy is zero. This implies that all expenditures that the SNGs have made are on 
behalf of the national government. In return, the national government will arrange some 
types of transfers which are usually conditional on specific programs and SNGs, in this 
case, have no discretion to allocate funding in accordance with their preferences.  
 
In practice, the cases of perfect fiscal decentralisation and perfect fiscal 
centralisation are extreme and are not observed in modern societies. Accordingly, the 
cases represented in rows 2–5 would be consistent with typical real world examples, 
where the countries have some degree of fiscal decentralisation or some degree of fiscal 
centralisation. We consider panel B first. In row 2, it is assumed that SNGs’ own-sourced 
revenue is 40 units whereas subnational expenditure and total public sector expenditure 
are both 100 units, as represented in columns 1, 2 and 3 of the table. If fiscal 
decentralisation is defined by the fiscal autonomy equation (3.1) only, the index for this 
country would be 0.4 (column 4) – the relative “fiscal” centralised case. If fiscal 
decentralisation is defined by the fiscal importance equation (3.2) only, the index would 
be unity (column 5) – perfect fiscal decentralisation. As a result, misleading inferences 
will be made about the degree of fiscal decentralisation if it is defined only in terms of 
equation (3.1) or equation (3.2). When both equations are simultaneously used, as in 
equation (3.3), a truer indication of the degree of FDI for this country emerges: 0.63 
(column 6) which suggests relative fiscal decentralisation. Similarly for the second 
scenario of panel B as presented in row 3, when own-sourced revenue, subnational 
expenditure and total public sector expenditure are assumed to be 40, 40 and 100 units.   65
The values from the fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance are 1 and 0.4 respectively. 
Individually, these values again provide misleading inference about the degree of fiscal 
decentralisation of the country: the value of fiscal autonomy indicates perfect fiscal 
decentralisation, whereas the value of fiscal importance points to relative fiscal 
centralisation. However, when equations (3.1) and (3.2) are simultaneously used, there is 
a balancing of the two potentially contradictory elements of fiscal decentralisation and 
the true value of FDI is 0.63 (column 6) – the case of relative fiscal decentralisation. 
 
Examples of relative fiscal centralisation are shown in panel C of Table 3.1. In 
row 4, the values of SNGs’ own-sourced revenue, SNGs’ expenditure and total public 
sector expenditure are 60, 100, and 500, respectively. The values of fiscal autonomy and 
fiscal importance for this case are 0.6 and 0.2 respectively, so the FDI value is 
0.5 (0.6 0.2) 0.35 ×=  – relative fiscal centralisation. In row 5, an amount of 20 is assumed 
for the value of SNGs’ own-sourced revenue, an amount of 100 is assumed for SNGs’ 
expenditure, and an amount of 167 is assumed for total public sector expenditure. The 
measure of fiscal autonomy is: 20 100 0.2 = , the measure of SNGs’ fiscal importance is: 
100 167 0.6 = , and the measure of fiscal decentralisation is: 
0.5 (0.2 0.6) 0.35. ×=  The 
conclusion to be drawn is that this country represents a case of relative fiscal 
centralisation. Once again, the inference on the degree of fiscal decentralisation of a 
particular country will be misleading if either equation (3.1) (fiscal autonomy) or 
equation (3.2) (fiscal importance) is used by itself. 
 
The notion of fiscal decentralisation is conceived in this thesis as a relative 
concept that is determined by the proportion of total public sector expenditure financed 
by subnational own-sourced revenue. Subnational expenditure is a scaling factor that 
plays no role in determining relative magnitudes of fiscal decentralisation. 
 
3.3.3  The form of the index 
 
The two components of the fiscal decentralisation index are: (i) fiscal autonomy 
of subnational governments (SNGs), defined as the ratio of own-sourced revenue (OSR)   66
to total subnational expenditure (E); and (ii) the fiscal importance of SNGs, defined as 
, ET E where TE is the total public sector expenditure. The first component OSR E is 
expected to be a positive fraction as subnational own-sourced revenue is expected to be 
always less than subnational expenditure, with the difference usually funded by transfers 
to subnational governments from the national government. The second ratioET E also 
lies between zero and one as total public sector expenditure TE includes subnational 
expenditure E and expenditure from the national government. The index is the geometric 
mean of fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance: 





This form of the index means that it is also a positive fraction.  
 
Why is the geometric mean used for the index (3.3) above, rather than, say, the 
arithmetic mean? To address this issue, we consider an “idealised” general index of fiscal 
decentralisation as a function of the two key dimensions OSR and TE, and write this 
index as:  
(3.4)      () II O S R , T E . =  
Our approach is to identify the properties of the index function  ( ) I. , . on the basis of 
economic considerations. This way of proceeding is not unlike Fisher’s (1927) test 
approach to price indices. It is to be noted that we do not assume that the OSR and TE 
will increase equally. The own-sourced revenue OSR of the states and the total public 
sector expenditure TE can vary independently. 
 
By definition, SNGs have full autonomy over subnational own-sourced revenues 
generated by their own taxes and charges. As such, the higher the subnational own-
sourced revenue, the higher the degree of fiscal decentralisation. On the other hand, total 
public sector expenditure will provide a negative effect on the value of the index. This is 
because an increase in total public sector expenditure relative to subnational own-sourced 
revenue ensures that subnational governments become more dependent, in relative terms, 
on the national government for revenue, and this is likely to be determined predominately   67
at the national government’s discretion. As a result, it is reasonable to suppose that for a 
given value of  , TE  the index I  increases with  ; OSR  and that the index decreases with 
TE  when OSR  is held constant. That is,  0 IO S R ∂ ∂>  and  0. IT E ∂ ∂<  Furthermore, if 
OSR  and TE   increase by the same amount, it seems reasonable to suppose that one 
would just counterbalance the other, so that the value of the index I  remains unchanged. 









or dividing both sides by  : I  
(3.5)      0.
II II





The first term on the left-hand side of the above equation is the elasticity of the index 
with respect to OSR , while the second term is the elasticity with respect to  . TE  Equation 









 be the own-sourced revenue elasticity of the index I. We can 
establish that α is a positive fraction. As  0, 0; IO S R I ∂ ∂>>  and  0, OSR >  it follows 
that  0.
II I O S R




 Next, to show that the upper value of α is unity, we 
fix the value of total public sector expenditure TE  at  0 TE  and consider the index I  as a 
function of  , OSR  as in the graph below.  
 
As  0, IO S R ∂∂ >  the curve is clearly positively sloped and if, as is reasonable, 
() 0 0, 0, II T E ==  it also comes out of the origin. The graph considers two possibilities: 
the curve labelled a, which has a decreasing marginal effect, and the curve b with an 
increasing marginal effect. It is clear that the curve a with the decreasing marginal effect 
is the more attractive possibility, as this means that higher and higher OSR  is valued less 
and less in terms of its impact on fiscal decentralisation (when TE  is held constant).   68
Consider the point z on the curve a. Here the slope of the tangent is less than the slope of 
the ray from the origin. As the elasticity of the index I  with respect to OSR  is just the 
ratio of the former slope to the latter, it follows that this elasticity is less than unity at z. 
This property holds for all points along the curve a, but not along b. This establishes that 













As the above involves a constraint on the elasticity, it is convenient to use a 
constant elasticity formulation, so that: 
log log log log , ⎛⎞ =α −α =α ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
OSR
IO S RT E
TE
 
or in exponential form: 








To say more about the elasticity α , suppose that it is a random variable,  , α   with 
probability distribution () . f α   As  [ ] 0,1 , α∈  the expected value of α   is 
() ()
1
0 . α= α α α ∫    Ef d If each value of α   between zero and one is equiprobable, so that 
() α  f is standard uniform, then  ()12 . α=  E  In the absence of further information on the 





nature of the elasticity, it is reasonable to use this centre-of-gravity value of 12. 
Equation (3.6) then becomes: 
1
2
, ⎛⎞ == = × ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
OSR OSR OSR E
I
TE TE E TE
 
which is equation (3.3).  
 
3.3.4  Economic welfare and the new fiscal decentralisation index 
 
The welfare consequences of fiscal activity will depend on many factors that have 
not been considered in the development of the fiscal decentralisation, such as: the 
composition of public expenditure across different levels of government; fiscal 
externalities including congestion and spill-over effects arising from the government 
provisions of public goods and services. However, some provisional commentary on the 
relationship between the values of the fiscal decentralisation index and economic welfare 
is no doubt useful.    
 
Assume that: (i) there are two publicly provided services, service X is a pure 
public good, and service Y is an impure or local public good; and (ii) the national 
government only provides the pure public service X and the subnational governments 
only provide impure public service Y and each level of government enjoys full fiscal 
autonomy. When demand for public provision of services is limited to the pure public 
good X, the relationship between welfare and the fiscal decentralisation index will be 
very different to the case where the demand for public goods is limited to the impure 
local public good Y. 
 
In the first two figures a and b, welfare is maximised under complete fiscal 
decentralisation (FDI = 1 when the impure public good Y is provided entirely by 
subnational government and no pure public good is provided at all) or complete fiscal 
centralisation (FDI = 0 when only the pure public good is provided by the national 
government and no impure public good is provided at all). However, these extreme cases 
are unrealistic - they are the outcomes of a thought experiment only. Figure c, adding a   70
tough (but only a touch) of reality, by assuming that the demand for public expenditure is 
divided equally between the pure public good (provided by the national government) and 









Figure a:    Demand entirely for impure 
public good Y 
Figure b: Demand entirely for pure 
public good X 
 
Figure c shows that welfare is maximised when the degree of fiscal 
decentralisation matches the demand for the pure public good and the impure public 
good. That is, half the fiscal activities are undertaken by the national government (to 
supply pure public good X) and half by subnational governments (to provide the impure 
public good Y) giving the index value of 0.5 for fiscal decentralisation when each level of 
government has full fiscal autonomy. However, given that the precise benefits from fiscal 
decentralisation are not quantified, we do not have any information on the actual 
magnitude of the slope of the welfare curve represented by Figure c as one moves away 









Figure c: Equal proportion between pure and impure public goods 
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Core first generation theory actually implies that the welfare function is skewed to 
the left, with the efficient value being above 0.5. This is because demand for impure 
public goods typically exceeds that of pure public goods. However, as the composition of 
demand for pure and impure public goods will vary across countries, there is no unique 
link between the fiscal decentralisation index and economic welfare. For one country, 
welfare may be maximised when the FDI = 0.75 (figure d) and for another country, it 
may be maximised when FDI = 0.6 (figure e) and so on. The relative level of welfare 
under the FDI = 0 and FDI = 1 in figures d and e is also uncertain for a realistic welfare 
function. In both cases, the outcome will be suboptimal when consumers demand a 
combination of the pure and impure public goods. However, it is unclear whether the 










Figures d and e: Unequal proportion of pure and impure public goods  
 
3.4  The fiscal decentralisation index: applications for selected countries 
 
3.4.1  Sample of countries  
 
The main purpose of this section is to establish the fiscal decentralisation index 
for both developing and developed economies to facilitate subsequent and definitive 
comparison of the degree of fiscal decentralisation across countries. Countries from the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) – advanced countries 
in the level of per capita income and the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) – developing countries with low level of per capita income, except for 
0 1 
Welfare 
0.75  0  1 
Welfare 
0.6   72
Singapore, and some selected countries from outside these two groups, are considered. 
Due to a lack of data, some countries from the OECD and ASEAN are not included. 
TABLE 3.2 









Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Germany, Luxembourg, Mexico, Spain, 
Switzerland, and United States 
 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, 

















3.4.2  Results 
 
The results are reported in Table 3.3, which reports on countries from: the OECD 
(items 1 to 23 inclusive); the ASEAN (items 24 and 27 inclusive); and other countries 
(items 28 to 31). For example, consider the first row in Table 3.3, by reading across the 
row, it can be seen that, in 2005, total SNGs’ own-sourced revenue in Australia was 
$89,110, SNGs’ expenditure was $144,646, and total public sector expenditure was 
$319,379 (in millions of Australian dollars). The measure of the fiscal autonomy for 
Australia is: $89,110 $144,646 0.62 = , the measure of the fiscal importance is: 
$144,646 $319,379 0.45 = , and the FDI value is: ()
0.5 0.62 0.45 0.53 ×= .  
 
It is expected that median levels of fiscal decentralisation for “developed” and 
“developing” nations will be different. Similarly, there will be differences for federal 
versus unitary nations. To capture these possible variations for the comparison, countries 
are selected on these bases and on the availability of fiscal data. The indices presented in 
Table 3.3 reflect the expected various degrees of fiscal decentralisation between unitary 
and federal countries, and between developed and developing economies. The degree of 
Deleted: Due to an unavailability 
of information and data, not all 
OECD and ASEAN countries are 
selected. High income OECD 
countries such as Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Japan, Germany, 
Switzerland and The United States 
of America, etc. are selected. The 
representatives for ASEAN 
economies are Malaysia, Thailand, 
and Vietnam. Other countries are 





Deleted: The main purpose of 
this research is to develop the 
fiscal decentralisation index for a 
range of developing and developed 
economies to facilitate subsequent 
investigations of the relationship 
between fiscal decentralisation and 
economic growth in the later part. 
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fiscal decentralisation in federal countries is generally higher than that of unitary 
countries. Also, with developed countries, the SNGs are more advanced in terms of 
managerial capability and experience in comparison with developing countries. As a 
result, the degree of fiscal decentralisation is generally expected to be greater in 
developed countries than in developing countries. 
TABLE 3.3 



























= ∑   TE FA FI  FDI 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
1. Australia  2005  Mil.  AUD  89,110  144,646  319,379  0.62    0.45    0.53  
2. Austria  2005  Mil.  Euro  11,584  42,575  114,300  0.27    0.37    0.32  
3. Belgium  2005  Mil.  Euro  25,546  62,456  150,840  0.41    0.41    0.41  
4.  Canada  2005  Mil. CAD  305,000  397,000  550,000  0.77   0.72   0.74  
5.  Czech Rep.  2005  Mil. Koruny  201,000  259,000  1,205,000  0.78   0.22   0.41  
6. Denmark  2004  Mil.  Kroner  295,879  448,442  774,572  0.66    0.58    0.62  
7. Finland  2005  Mil.  Euro  21,534  30,545  78,954  0.70    0.39    0.52  
8.  France  2005  Mil. Euro  132,000  174,000  909,000  0.76   0.19   0.38  
9. Germany  2002  Mil.  Euro  326,000  458,000  1,057,000  0.71    0.43    0.56  
10. Hungary  2005  Mil. Forint  1,377,000  2,850,000  10,875,000  0.48   0.26   0.36  
11. Ireland  2005  Mil. Euro  4,994  8,128  51,202  0.61   0.16   0.31  
12. Italy  2005  Mil. Euro  123,000  208,000  681,000  0.59   0.31   0.43  
13. Luxembourg  2005  Mil. Euro  825  1,315  11,903  0.63   0.11   0.26  
14. Mexico  2005  Mil. Pesos  248,299  468,941  1,058,919  0.53   0.44   0.48  
15. Netherlands  2005  Mil. Euro  27,426  80,534  228,991  0.34   0.35   0.35  
16. Norway  2005  Mil. Kroner  154,000  241,000  798,000  0.64   0.30   0.44  
17. Poland  2005  Mil. Zlotys  61,370  116,283  409,689  0.53   0.28   0.39  
18. Slovak Republic  2005  Mil. Koruny  63,000  85,000  552,000  0.74   0.15   0.34  
19. Spain  2005  Mil. Euro  115,792  171,634  330,912  0.67   0.52   0.59  
20. Sweden  2005  Mil. Kroner  542,000  638,000  1,464,000  0.85   0.44   0.61  
21. Switzerland  2002  Mil. Franc  81,663  98,021  153,759  0.83   0.64   0.73  
22. United Kingdom  2005  Mil. GBP  49,106  150,797  538,576  0.33   0.28   0.30  
23. United States  2002  Mil. USD  1,737,890  2,040,100  3,713,300  0.85   0.55   0.68  
24. Indonesia  1999  Mil. Rupiah  1,843,000  7,576,000  54,983,000  0.24   0.14   0.18  
25. The Philippines  1992  Bil. Pesos  11,847  25,305  265,629  0.47   0.10   0.21  
26. Thailand  2001  Mil. Bahts  84,964  141,722  1,154,715  0.60  0.12  0.27 
27. Vietnam  2007  Bil. VND  30,559  150,543  423,058  0.20  0.36  0.27 
28. China  2003  Mil. Yuan  492,499  1,722,985  2,464,995  0.29  0.70  0.45 
29. Argentina  2004  Mil. Pesos  25,373  35,567  90,689  0.71   0.39   0.53  
30. Brazil  1998  Mil. Reais  146,339  181,870  400,382  0.80   0.45   0.60  
31. India  1999  Bil. Rupees  1,188,400  2,675,800  5,869,500  0.44   0.46   0.45  
Source: Author's calculations. Data
6 from various issues of Government Finance Statistics (IMF), except for China 
             and Vietnam (from the country’s Ministry of Finance). 
                                                 
6   Due to data limitation, SNGs’ own-sourced revenue in the calculations excludes fiscal transfers from the 
national government, but it includes revenue from the shared tax with the national government.   74
FIGURE 3.1

























































































































































































































































  Source: Table 3.3. 
 
3.4.3  The fundamental fiscal decentralisation index: a long-period perspective 
 
The application of the FDI is now extended across countries for an extended 
period of time. The purpose of this section is to provide more evidence on the changes of 
a degree of fiscal decentralisation for the same country across years. Countries are 
selected purely based on an availability of fiscal data. A sample of countries, together 
with the period in which a degree of fiscal decentralisation is measured, is found in Table 
3.4. Using equation (3.3) for the FDI, all fiscal data on governments’ revenue and 
expenditure are taken from various issues of the Government Finance Statistics 
yearbooks of the International Monetary Fund.   
 
Figure 3.2 presents the changes in the degree of fiscal decentralisation across 
countries over a period of time. There is no clear trend in these changes, regardless of 
fiscal arrangement and level of economic growth of these countries. The degree of fiscal 
decentralisation is quite stable over the years in these countries. This view can be 
justified from the fact that fiscal decentralisation is closely related to other forms of 
decentralisation such as political and management decentralisations.  
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TABLE 3.4 
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION FOR THE FDI ACROSS COUNTRIES 
 













          
1 Argentina  F  23  2,221  1975-2004 
2 Australia  F  8  700  1975-2005 
3 Austria  F  8 2,358  1975-2005 
4 Belgium  F  9 589  1978-2005 
5 Brazil  F  27 5,508  1975-1994 
6 Canada  F  13 5,000  1975-2005 
7 Denmark  U  14 275  1975-2004 
8 France  U  26 36,000  1975-2005 
9 Germany  F  16 15,000  1975-2005 
10 India  F  25 440  1975-1999 
11 Indonesia  U  27 277  1975-1993 
12 Luxembourg  U  12 168  1975-2002 
13 Malaysia  F  13 118  1975-1997 
14 Mexico  F  31 2,430  1975-2000 
15 Netherlands  U  12 633  1975-2005 
16 The  Philippines  U  76 41,924  1978-1992 
17 Spain  U  17 8,000  1975-2005 
18 Sweden  U  23 2,545  1975-2005 
19 Switzerland  F  26  3,000  1990-2002 
20 Thailand  U  75 6,745  1975-2005 
21 UK  U   540  1975-2005 
22 USA  F  50  87,525  1975-2002 
          
Source:  IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 2006.   76
FIGURE 3.2 
FISCAL DECENTRALISATION INDEX ACROSS COUNTRIES 
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FIGURE 3.2 
FISCAL DECENTRALISATION INDEX ACROSS COUNTRIES (Cont.) 
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FIGURE 3.2 
FISCAL DECENTRALISATION INDEX ACROSS COUNTRIES (Cont.) 
FDI: 1975 - 2002
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In addition, using the fiscal decentralisation indices developed in this study, no 
consistently positive (or negative) relationship between fiscal decentralisation and 
economic growth was identified when a panel regression was conducted for many 
countries in a period of time
7. This may be related to the non-unique relationship between 
                                                 
7 As a result, the finding was not reported in the study.   79
our measure of fiscal decentralisation and economic welfare as discussed in Section 
3.3.4. 
 
3.5  Concluding remarks 
 
The “fiscal autonomy” and “fiscal importance” of SNGs are the two core 
elements of fiscal decentralisation which provide the basis for measuring the degree of 
fiscal decentralisation in a manner that is consistent with fiscal theory. Fiscal autonomy 
of SNGs deals with the extent to which SNGs have the autonomy over their revenue-
raising powers necessary to fund their chosen expenditure programs. SNGs’ fiscal 
importance, however, concerns the extent to which total spending on public sector 
activities is undertaken by SNGs. Using the fundamental index of fiscal decentralisation 
(FDI) developed in this chapter, the degrees of fiscal decentralisation for various 
countries are systematically measured and compared.  
 
Until now, measures of fiscal decentralisation utilised in the English-speaking 
literature (be it ratio between local spending and total spending; or the ratio between local 
revenue and total revenue) have been crude and partial. As a result, the fundamental 
index of fiscal decentralisation developed with reference to the “fiscal autonomy and 
fiscal importance” approach in this chapter represents a broadly accurate, although 
approximate, basis for measuring the degree of fiscal decentralisation for the purpose of 
international comparisons.   
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CHAPTER 4 
FISCAL DECENTRALISATION INDEX:  
AN EXTENSION AND COMPARISON 
 
4.1  Introduction  
 
The fundamental index of fiscal decentralisation (FDI) based on the “fiscal 
autonomy and fiscal importance” approach to measuring fiscal decentralisation, as 
developed in Chapter 3, has deliberately abstracted from the influences of 
intergovernmental transfers and subnational governments’ debt on the fiscal autonomy of 
SNGs. By extensions, that “simplifying” assumption is now removed in this chapter.  
 
It is also relevant that the first formal index of fiscal decentralisation was 
developed in Italy by Scotto in the 1950s. Importantly, this index is superior to those 
developed in the English-language literature (Thieben, 2003; Yilmaz, 1999; Davoodi and 
Zoo, 1998; and Woller and Phillips, 1998), at least until now. This index is unknown in 
the English-speaking world, but has the advantage of being grounded in theory (generally 
Paretian fiscal theory) and providing a degree of sensitivity to important elements of 
fiscal decentralisation missing from the range of indices used in modern research.  
 
Even though Scotto’s index was developed in the 1950s, it has been completely 
ignored in the English-language literature until 2007, when it was discussed by Michael 
McLure (2007). In view of this, it is useful to revive the “Scotto index” of fiscal 
decentralisation and compare it with the fundamental index developed in Chapter 3 and 
the enhanced index of fiscal decentralisation developed in this chapter. The first 
contribution of this chapter is the development of the enhanced index. In addition, the 
second significant contribution of this chapter is the comparison and contrast of the first 
index of fiscal decentralisation (Scotto’s index) and the fundamental index of fiscal 
decentralisation developed in Chapter 3 and the enhanced index of fiscal decentralisation 
developed in this chapter.  
   81
Section 4.2 investigates the influences of intergovernmental fiscal transfers and 
SNGs’ debts on the fiscal autonomy of SNGs. The impact of these influences is then 
incorporated into the fundamental index (FDI) from Chapter 3 to develop an enhanced 
index of fiscal decentralisation (eFDI). The first index of fiscal decentralisation 
developed by Scotto is then examined in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 investigates the 
strengths and weaknesses of the fiscal decentralisation index developed by Scotto relative 
to the fundamental and enhanced indices of fiscal decentralisation (FDI and eFDI) 
developed in this study based on the “fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance” approach. 
Section 4.5 presents the applications of these two approaches to a measurement of fiscal 
decentralisation in Australia. Concluding remarks are in Section 4.6. 
 
4.2  The fiscal autonomy of subnational governments revisited 
 
The ratio of “own-sourced revenue” to “expenditure” of SNGs, as discussed in 
Section 3.3.2 of Chapter 3, provides the primary measure of fiscal autonomy. However, it 
is not a complete measure. Among other things, it does not account for either fiscal 
transfer from the national government to SNGs or the restriction of SNGs’ capacity to 
borrowings under their own authority. 
 
Of course, fiscal transfers do not influence SNGs’ autonomy to the same degree 
as own-sourced revenue does, as, in the case of the latter, SNGs have complete autonomy 
over their own tax rates and tax bases. Fiscal transfers to redress vertical fiscal imbalance 
act, on one perspective, to shield SNGs from responsibility for their own-sourced 
revenue-raising decisions. Nevertheless, such transfers have varying degrees of influence 
over subnational autonomy – it all depends on the form of the transfer. For example, 
unconditional grants provide SNGs with autonomy over the allocation of those grants. As 
such, they may provide a secondary, but nonetheless positive, influence on fiscal 
autonomy of SNGs. Conditional grants, in contrast, not only shield SNGs from autonomy 
over revenue-raising matters, but they also restrict the autonomy of SNGs by imposing 
conditions on the type of services that SNGs must provide when expending their grants.   82
The assignment of revenue-raising powers and expenditure responsibility of 
SNGs is already reflected in the measure of fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance in 
equations (3.1) and (3.2) of Chapter 3. In principle, these equations could be readily 
adjusted to account for the influence of intergovernmental fiscal transfers on SNGs’ fiscal 
autonomy. The degree of autonomy associated with fiscal transfers across levels of 
government is summarised in Table 4.1. 
 
TABLE 4.1 
SUBNATIONAL AUTONOMY OVER INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL TRANSFERS 
The impact on autonomy of SNGs from fiscal transfers received from the national government 
•  High negative impact on 
autonomy 
All transfers to SNGs are conditional. 
•  Moderate negative impact on 
autonomy 
Fiscal transfers are almost all conditional on their use. 
•  Moderate positive impact on 
autonomy 
Almost all fiscal transfers are unconditional.  
•  High positive impact on 
autonomy 
Clear transfer mechanism is set up and it is assured by the 
Constitution and/or laws and transfers are significantly 
unconditional. 
Source: Author’s development. 
 
The adjustment to equation (3.1) of Chapter 3 needs to account for the positive 
impact from unconditional transfers (from the national government to SNGs), and the 
negative impact of conditional transfers (from the national government to SNGs) on 
SNGs’ fiscal autonomy. As the amount of the transfer is determined by the national 
government, it must have less positive significance for the autonomy of SNGs than the 
own-sourced revenue decisions made by SNGs. However, as the expenditure of 
unconditional grants is at the discretion of SNGs, it has some positive impact. The task is 
then to measure the ratio of net unconditional transfers to SNGs (i.e. unconditional 
transfers less conditional transfers) to total SNGs’ expenditure, and then discount it by 
some value in recognition of the fact that the national government, and not SNGs, has 
determined the value of unconditional grants. For simplicity, this discount is determined 
by the ratio of unconditional transfers (from the national government to SNGs) to the 
total transfers (from the national government to SNGs). This reflects the view that the 
greater the national government’s propensity to provide grants to SNGs on an 
unconditional basis, then the greater the national government’s propensity to account for   83
local preferences by setting the amount of the transfer close to the level that the welfare-
maximising SNGs would collect if they had the national government’s taxing powers (but 
not the national government’s expenditure responsibilities). More formally, SNGs’ fiscal 
autonomy from fiscal transfers received (“SNGs-T autonomy”) is: 




































= ∑   represent total transfers, total unconditional 
transfers, and total conditional transfers to SNGs from the national government, 
respectively. By way of definitional classification, it should be noted that, for the purpose 
of this index, unconditional transfers include SNGs’ share of revenue from shared taxes 
when the national government has the authority to define the tax base, set the tax rate and 
determine the rules under which the tax revenue is shared between different levels of 
government. Revenue from such “taxes” is not classed as “own-sourced revenue” and is 
instead treated as a transfer from the national government. For example, in the case of 
Australia, Goods and Services Tax (GST) revenue would be classed as unconditional 
Commonwealth Government transfers to the states because the Commonwealth 
Government’s legislation sets the tax base, specifies the rate and determines the share 
(100 per cent) of revenue that goes to the states. 
  
  In conclusion, when fiscal autonomy of SNGs is strictly considered, the fiscal 
autonomy, represented by equation (3.1) of Chapter 3, should be adjusted to reflect the 
effect of intergovernmental fiscal transfers from the national government to fiscal 
autonomy of SNGs. As a result, an enhanced measure of fiscal decentralisation is: 
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In addition, SNGs’ fiscal autonomy may also be influenced by constraints of 
SNGs’ borrowing. In principle, this could be accounted for the degree of fiscal autonomy 
in the following manner: 
TABLE 4.2 
FISCAL AUTONOMY OF SNGs OVER SUBNATIONAL BORROWINGS 
a = 0  Very low autonomy  No subnational borrowings are allowed. 
a = 0.25  Low autonomy  SNGs can borrow with a heavy administration from the national 
government. 
a = 0.5  Moderate autonomy  SNGs arrange borrowings from both domestic and overseas 
sources but all borrowings must satisfy strict requirements from the 
national government. 
a = 0.75  High autonomy  Borrowing is acceptable given some economic regulations are met. 
a = 1.0  Very high autonomy  SNGs can borrow without any intervention from the national 
government. 
Source: Author’s development. 
 























= ∑  represents total SNGs’ debts and 01 . a ≤ ≤  As such, the complete version 
of the fiscal autonomy of SNGs which takes into account SNGs’ autonomy over their 
expenditure decisions, revenue-raising powers, fiscal transfers and SNGs’ borrowings are 
























Therefore, an even more comprehensive index would be represented by: 























Unfortunately, the values of a   would, in practice, have to be determined 
subjectively; data are simply not available to obtain an objective measure. In view of this,   85
the impact of the authority of SNGs over their borrowings has been set aside in the 
remainder of this dissertation. As a consequence, the enhanced index of fiscal 
decentralisation, as presented in equation (2.2), is used in this chapter. 
 
It is important to note that while the importance of equation (2.2) of this section is 
clearly evident from an “in principle” perspective, it is of more limited relevance to 
cross-country studies, such as that considered in Section 3.4 of Chapter 3, because of data 
limitations. Data on the share of conditional and unconditional transfers from national 
government to SNGs are not published by international institutions such as the IMF. 
However, the enhanced index can still be used for countries in which data are published 
on both conditional and unconditional grants. An illustration from Australia’s fiscal data 
is considered in Section 4.4 of this chapter. 
 
4.3  The first index of fiscal decentralisation: Scotto’s index 
 
In the Italian article “Di un indice di decentramento finanziario” (1950), Aldo 
Scotto (1916–1992) is the first pioneer who developed the first fiscal decentralisation 
index in the history of public economics (McLure, 2007), known as Scotto’s index 
() S FDI . Scotto’s index is still not available in English, but a summary of it appears in 
The Paretian School and Italian Fiscal Sociology from McLure (2007, pp.156-8). In his 
first index, two main components are considered: (i) the public-revenue raising, and (ii) 
the expenditure of public fund. In a typical setting of an economy, there are three levels 
of government: national government, regional (or state/provincial) government, and local 
government. The last two levels form SNGs. Two components of Scotto’s index, one for 
revenue and the other for expenditure, are defined as: 
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where  p   stands for proportion, R and E represent revenue and expenditure and n 
indicates the number of governments. The subscripts of 0, 1, and 2 represent the order of 
the government level – national, regional (the first-order level of SNGs), and local (the 
second-order level of SNGs) levels, respectively. For example,  012 ,,
R RR ppp  are  the 
revenue shares of the national, regional, and local levels, respectively. The sum of all 
revenue (expenditure) shares is unity. As such, it is clear that: 
(3.3)     012 1;
RRR ppp ++=   and 
(3.4)     012 1.
EEE ppp ++=  
 
Scotto’s index is the arithmetic mean of two components. That is: 









The country is considered as perfectly fiscally centralised if the national 
government generates all revenue and arranges all public spending. It means that  0 1;
R p =  
and  0 1.
E p =  In this case, from equations (3.3) and (3.4), revenue shares and expenditure 
shares for all levels of SNGs are zero (i.e.  12 0;
RR pp + =  and  12 0).
EE pp + =  Using 
equations (3.1), (3.2), and (3.5), Scotto’s index is 1. As a result, it is clear that the 
minimum value of Scotto’s index is 1 when the country is under a perfect centralisation. 
Also, Scotto’s index concludes that the higher the index, the more fiscally decentralised 
the economy is, given that the lower bound of the index is 1 (McLure, 2007). 
 
Scotto’s index considers two dimensions to the importance of SNGs when 
measuring fiscal decentralisation. First, when revenue (expenditure) shares of each level 
of SNGs increase (i.e. an increase of  12 12 ,,,
R REE p ppp ), the index will increase and vice 
versa. As such, Scotto’s index is sensitive with the revenue (expenditure) shares of each 
government level. Second, when the number of governments in each tier of SNGs 
increases (i.e. an increase of  1 n  and  2 n ), Scotto’s index will also increase. So, the number 
of SNGs does contribute to the sensitivity of Scotto’s index.    87
 
TABLE 4.3 
THE ILLUSTRATIONS OF SCOTTO'S INDEX 
Case  Row 
No.  Item 
No. 1  No. 2  No. 3 
1. Expenditure  shares:       
2.    National () 0
E p   0.50 0.30  0.50 
3.    Regional  () 1
E p   0.40 0.45  0.40 
4.    Local  ( ) 2
E p   0.10 0.25  0.10 
5.    Sum 1.00  1.00  1.00 
6. Revenue  shares:      
7.    National  () 0
R p   0.60 0.50  0.60 
8.    Regional  () 1
R p   0.35 0.40  0.35 
9.    Local  ( ) 2
R p   0.05 0.10  0.05 
10.    Sum 1.00  1.00  1.00 
11. No.  of  governments:      
12.    Regional  () 1 n   10 10  40 
13.    Local  ( ) 2 n   20 20  50 
14. Summary  of  results:      
15.     E d   1.83 2.80  1.95 
16.     R d   1.57 1.83  1.64 
17.        S FDI   1.70 2.32  1.80 
 
To illustrate the sensitivity of this index, three cases are examined. It is assumed 
that a country consists of three levels of government: the national government, and a 
number of regional and local governments. Expenditure shares, revenue shares and the 
number of government in each tier of SNGs are provided in Table 4.3. Case 1 is 
considered as the base case. Using equations (3.1), (3.2), and (3.5), Scotto’s index and 
two main components are calculated. As shown in row 17 of Case 1, Scotto’s fiscal index 
for this hypothetical country is 1.70. 
 
Revenue and expenditure shares for the national government fall when moving 
from Case 1 to Case 2. Conversely, as a result, revenue and expenditure shares for   88
regional and local governments increase in Case 2 as the sum of all revenue (or 
expenditure) shares must equal unity. With other variables (the number of government by 
each level held fixed between Case 1 and Case 2), Scotto’s index is now 2.32 (as shown 
in row 17), up from 1.70 in Case 1. This case illustrates the sensitivity of Scotto’s index 
when the relative fiscal shares among levels of government change. 
 
In Case 3, revenue and expenditure shares of each level government are 
unchanged from Case 1, but the number of SNGs increases, from 10 to 40 for the 
provincial level (as shown in row 12), and from 20 to 50 for the local level (as shown in 
row 13). This allows us to test the sensitivity of Scotto’s index when the number of SNGs 
increases while holding other variables constant. Scotto’s index changes because the 
index for Case 3 is 1.80, up from 1.70 in Case 1 (as shown in row 17). In conclusion, the 
above example illustrates that Scotto’s index does take into account changes in: (i) 
revenue and expenditure shares of all tiers of government, and (ii) the number of SNGs.  
 
4.4  Scotto’s index versus the two new indices (FDI and eFDI) 
 
While many studies have attempted to develop a fiscal decentralisation index in 
various ways, a complete measure of the fiscal decentralisation has not been developed. 
The partial nature of the most typical approach to a measurement of fiscal 
decentralisation, such as ratios of local revenue (or expenditure) in the total public 
revenue (or expenditure) are self-evident. Nevertheless, Scotto’s index did take into 
account the distribution of aggregate revenue and expenditure between each tier of SNGs. 
Furthermore, his index is sensitive to a number of subnational units whereas all other 
measures are not.  
 
As noted earlier, the indices of fiscal decentralisation developed in the English-
language literature are partial and poorly connected to theory. As such, they are clearly 
inferior to the indices developed in Chapters 3 and 4. However, as Scotto’s pioneering 
index, unknown outside Italy, is much better linked to fiscal theory than that of English-  89
language literature, it is useful to compare it with the indices developed under the “fiscal 
autonomy and fiscal importance” approach.  
TABLE 4.4 
SCOTTO’S INDEX VERSUS INDICES IN 
THE “FISCAL AUTONOMY AND FISCAL IMPORTANCE” APPROACH 
Item  
Scotto’s index 
() S FDI  
Indices in the “fiscal autonomy and 
fiscal importance” approach: 
( ) FDI and eFDI  
Conceptual  Scotto’s index is sensitive to: (i) fiscal 
shares (revenue and expenditure) of 
SNGs; and (ii) a number of SNGs. It is 
fundamental. 
Autonomy of SNGs is considered by 
developing the autonomy ratio (equation 
3.1 of Chapter 3) and SNGs – fiscal 
transfer autonomy as discussed in Section 
4.2 of Chapter 4. This fills in the 






Practical  Simplicity.  Fiscal data is required at an adequate level 
for the FDI in equation (3.3) of Chapter 3. 
This requirement can be easily met by 
many developing and transition economies. 
International Financial Statistics of the IMF 
are a good source of required data. 
Conceptual  Fiscal autonomy is completely ignored.  
The indices developed in Chapters 3 and 4 
are sensitive to fiscal shares of SNGs. 
However, they do not take into account the 
number of SNGs. This potential weakness 





Practical  Substantial fiscal data for both the 
national government and SNGs are 
required. This is not practical for 
developing and transition economies. 
Data for unconditional transfers to SNGs 
are not widely available. As such, the 
eFDI, as shown in equation (2.2) of this 
chapter, is difficult to use widely because 
of data limitations. 
 
Scotto’s index enjoys the distinction of being the first index of fiscal 
decentralisation in the public finance literature. Until now, it has also enjoyed the 
distinction of being the best index of fiscal decentralisation available. The new indices 
(FDI and eFDI) developed under the “fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance” approach 
should represent the advancement. Table 4.4 presents the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of Scotto’s index and the two newly-developed indices.   90
 
Scotto’s index is the index par excellence for the “fiscal importance” of 
decentralisation. This alone makes it superior to many indices which also emphasised 
fiscal importance. Indices developed under the “fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance” 
approach, in contrast, have a clear advantage relating to the treatment of the “fiscal 
autonomy” of SNGs. 
 
4.5  Measuring fiscal decentralisation: application for Australia 
 
The relative comparisons between Scotto’s index and the enhanced index of fiscal 
decentralisation (eFDI) are now discussed. Australia is used for this purpose over the 
period from 1975 to 2002. As previously discussed, the minimum value of the index of 
fiscal decentralisation, indicating perfect fiscal centralisation, is one for Scotto’s index 
and zero for the enhanced index. The Scotto approach has no maximum, whereas the 
enhanced index has a maximum value, indicating perfect fiscal decentralisation, of one. 
Figure 4.1 reveals that the trends of Scotto’s index and the enhanced index are very 
consistent.  
FIGURE 4.1
SCOTTO'S INDEX AND eFDI





















































The first point to note is how close the trends of the two indices are. When 
considered more closely, though, the percentage changes in the index values between two 
years are significant, as shown in Figure 4.2. For the period of 28 years, from 1975 to 
2002, the relative changes in these two indices are very similar. However, in some 
particular instances, the enhanced index (eFDI) developed in this chapter is more 
Scotto’s index
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sensitive to variations in comparison with Scotto’s index. This is because the enhanced 
index is able to pick up the changes in autonomy which are reflected in the degree of 
fiscal decentralisation.  
FIGURE 4.2
PERCENTAGE CHANGES OVER YEARS
SCOTTO'S INDEX AND THE eFDI












































The relative change in the degree of fiscal decentralisation in Australia was more 
volatile in 1983, 1988, and 1997. These significant changes can be justified by particular 
events in Australian fiscal federalism. From 1983 to 1989, states introduced franchise 
fees and financial institutions duty on tobacco, fuel and liquor. As such, SNGs’ own-
sourced revenue increased and, as a result, the degree of fiscal decentralisation increased 
because of the increase in states’ fiscal revenue-raising capacity relative to its expenditure 
obligations. Importantly, SNGs’ own-sourced revenue does not equal their expenditure 
due to the debts, which is authorised by the federal government via the operation of the 
Australian Loan Council. Also, a decrease in the degree of fiscal decentralisation in 1997 
can be explained by the fact that, in 1997, the state governments lost the taxing powers on 
the franchise fees, which was replaced by Commonwealth Revenue Replacement 
Payments, after the decision from the High Court stating that states’ franchise fees are 
constitutionally invalid (Department of Treasury and Finance of Western Australia, 
2006). As such, own-sourced revenue of SNGs fall and their fiscal autonomy must also 
fall. These payments, together with financial institutions duty and debits tax, have now 
been replaced by the Goods and Services Tax grants imposed by the Commonwealth 
Government.       
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An important example of a reduction in fiscal autonomy of SNGs is illustrated in 
the year 2000 onwards. Since the year 2000, the degree of fiscal decentralisation has 
decreased. This can be explained by a decrease in the level of fiscal autonomy. In June 
1999, the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Reform of Commonwealth-State Financial 
Relations (“IGA”) was signed between Australia’s Prime Minister and the state premiers. 
From the federal view, the main purpose of this agreement was to allow all states access 
into a stable and growing-revenue base with the introduction of the Goods and Services 
Tax. In return, the financial assistance grants from the federal government to states, 
together with financial institutions duty, and other taxes were abolished. In money terms, 
all states are better off. However, this scheme makes states depend more heavily on the 
federal government for revenue because the bases and rates of the Goods and Services 
Tax are determined by the federal government. As such, states cannot increase their 
revenue from the Goods and Services Tax. In this sense, fiscal autonomy of SNGs in 
Australia decreases, and, as a result, the degree of fiscal decentralisation falls.  
 
From Figure 4.2, it is clear that Scotto’s index and the enhanced index have a 
similar trend. While Scotto’s index provides a relatively more comprehensive measure of 
the fiscal importance of SNGs, the enhanced index represents an absolutely more 
comprehensive measure of the fiscal autonomy of SNGs. In addition, the enhanced index 
is more sensitive to short-term changes of fiscal decentralisation compared with its 
companion – Scotto’s index. 
 
4.6  Conclusion 
 
The first contribution of this chapter is to develop a complete measure of fiscal 
autonomy of SNGs, and, by extension, the enhanced index which is developed on the 
grounds of the fundamental index of fiscal decentralisation developed in Chapter 3. In the 
enhanced index, the fiscal autonomy of SNGs takes into account the impact of 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers on subnational fiscal autonomy. However, a practical 
limitation of this enhanced index, as represented by equation (2.2) of this chapter, is that 
its application is constrained in a wide range of countries because of data limitations.   93
 
The second contribution of the chapter is to revive the first index of fiscal 
decentralisation and compare the relative strengths and weaknesses of this first index and 
the enhanced index. Scotto developed the first systematic index of fiscal decentralisation. 
Its main strengths are simplicity and sensitivity to a number of governments and their 
respective shares. This is an index par excellence for capturing the “fiscal importance” of 
SNGs. However, this index largely ignores the fundamental issue of the fiscal autonomy 
of SNGs and its index values have no upper bounds.  
 
Until now, fiscal autonomy of SNGs has been largely ignored in the measurement 
of fiscal decentralisation. On these issues, the “fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance” 
approach is superior. The “fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance” approach highlights 
the autonomy of SNGs and the index value is bounded between zero and one. However, 
in regards to fiscal importance, the “fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance” approach is 
insensitive to a number of governments, and from that perspective, is less effective than 
Scotto’s index. However, this potential weakness is, in part, addressed in Chapters 5 and 
6 of this study from a different perspective – through the use of the notion of entropy to 
identify the dispersion, or inequality, of fiscal activities within and between different 
regions. 